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Abstract
Rural households in many developing economies have incomes that vary seasonally.
We explore the implications of this income seasonality for household consumption. We
use household-level data from three Indian villages to document seasonal patterns in
income and consumption, and to test whether income seasonality produces seasonal
consumption variation. Our basic finding is that while there does appear to be some
seasonality in consumption patterns, it is much less pronounced than in the case of
income, and more surprisingly, that the patterns are quite similar for households with
very diﬀerent seasonal income patterns. While this finding is consistent with well-
functioning credit markets, we show, through simulations, that it is also consistent
with a simple buﬀering model of consumption in which cautious households cannot
borrow, but can save via the accumulation of assets. We provide evidence that suggests
that households rely more on buﬀering behavior than on credit markets to smooth
consumption under income seasonality.
Keywords: consumption smoothing, income seasonality, buﬀer stocks
JEL codes: E21, O12, Q12
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1. Introduction
Rural households in many poor agrarian economies–where rain-dependent crop cultivation
is the primary source of household income–have incomes that vary seasonally. And the
seasonal variation in income can be quite large. For instance, in the Indian villages we
study in this paper, cultivating households receive, on average, about 75% of their annual
income in a 3-month period.
What are the consequences of this pronounced income seasonality for consumption?
Empirical evidence suggests that household consumption levels also vary seasonally in rural
economies, leading in many cases to seasonal variation in nutritional status and health.1 The
presumption, especially in policy circles, has been that the observed consumption seasonality
is largely driven by the seasonal variation in income and that the link between the two can
be attributed to poorly functioning credit markets. Borrowing constraints caused by credit
market imperfections can indeed combine with income seasonality to produce consumption
seasonality. If households cannot borrow against future income during the slack season,
then consumption levels may well be lower during the period before the harvest. But before
we can conclude that the reduction of seasonal consumption variation is an appropriate
policy goal, and further, that policy interventions should be directed towards alleviating
credit constraints, two important unresolved questions need to be addressed.2
The first has to do with the sources of consumption seasonality. Even in settings where
incomes are highly seasonal, income seasonality need not be the source of consumption
seasonality. The latter may instead stem from any one or more of a number of sources,
among them, seasonal variation in prices, preferences, labor eﬀort, or precautionary savings
motives linked to seasonal patterns in the resolution of uncertainty about income. Secondly,
though borrowing constraints can, in principle, contribute to consumption seasonality, the
extent to which they do so in practice, remains an open question. Our focus in this paper is
on this second question. There is some evidence that credit constraints might prevent poor
agrarian households from smoothing consumption across years (see, for example, Morduch
(1990), Rosenzweig (1988) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)). However, except for Jacoby
& Skoufias (1998), there is little systematic evidence on whether these households are able
to smooth consumption across seasons.3
We use household-level panel data from three Indian villages collected by the Interna-
tional Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) to investigate whether
households able to smooth consumption across seasons, despite the seasonal variation in
1For instance, various articles in Chambers et al.(1981) and Sahn (1989) document nutritional deficiencies
during the “lean season”, before crops are harvested, in a variety of countries. Paxson (1992) finds evidence of
seasonal variation in total consumption expenditure in Thailand. Walker and Ryan (1990) presents evidence
on seasonal patterns in nutritional status in a sample of Indian villages, although deficits do not always
occur during the lean season.
2See Besley (1994) for a more detailed discussion of this point.
3Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) presents results on income and consumption seasonality using the same
data but diﬀerent methods from the ones we use. They reach similar conclusions regarding the ability of
households to smooth consumption across seasons.
A number of other papers have explored the implications of income seasonality for other aspects of
household behavior. For instance, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) examines the impact of income seasonality on
school attendance, while Behrman (1988) looks at the impact of seasonality on intra-household allocations.
Canagarajah and Pudney (1993) examine the eﬀects of illness and seasonal involuntary unemployment on
seasonal consumption.
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incomes. In the next section, we document seasonal patterns in income and expenditure,
and examine whether household consumption expenditure tracks household income across
seasons. We follow the methdology presented in Paxson (1992) and exploit the fact that sea-
sonal income patterns diﬀer across households within a village. We test whether households
that have diﬀerent seasonal income patterns also have diﬀerent seasonal consumption pat-
terns and, if so, whether seasonal consumption and income patterns are related. The results
show little evidence that household consumption tracks income across seasons. Although
there are significant seasonal changes in consumption expenditure common to households
within villages, the month-to-month variation in consumption is, on the whole, much less
pronounced than the month-to-month income variation. More surprisingly, we find that
the seasonal patterns in consumption are quite similar for households with very diﬀerent
seasonal income patterns. These findings suggest that the households in our sample are
able to and do smooth consumption in the face of seasonal income variation.
While the absence of “tracking” behavior is consistent with the absence of borrowing
constraints, it need not imply that credit markets function well within villages, and that
precautionary savings motives are unimportant. Recent research on buﬀer-stock models of
saving indicate that even in the complete absence of credit markets, cautious households may
accumulate and draw down stocks of physical or financial assets to maintain consumption
levels that vary little from year to year (see Deaton (1992)). In these models, large changes
in consumption come about only when stocks of assets are drawn down to zero, something
that may happen infrequently.
In Section 3 of the paper, we develop and simulate a seasonal version of the buﬀer-
stock model to investigate whether the degree of seasonal consumption smoothing observed
in the data is consistent with a buﬀering model. Our simulations indicate that even in
the complete absence of credit markets, buﬀering behavior can nearly eliminate systematic
seasonal consumption patterns. Therefore, our finding that household consumption does
not track household income across months does not necessarily imply that credit markets
function well within villages. We therefore turn, in Section 4 to other sources of evidence
regarding the relative importance of buﬀer stocks and credit markets in enabling households
to smooth consumption under income seasonality. Data constraints limit what we are able
to say, but the additional evidence we consider is indicative of buﬀering behavior and
suggests that borrowing constraints may be operative in two of the three villages. Section
5 concludes.
2. Seasonal patterns in income and consumption
This section presents descriptive information on seasonal patterns in income and expendi-
ture for households from three villages in south-central India. The data we use come from
the Village-Level Studies (VLS) longitudinal household surveys carried out by the Interna-
tional Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), based in Hyderabad,
India. We use information from the villages of Aurepalle in the state of Andhra Pradesh,
and Shirapur and Kanzara in the state of Maharashtra. In each village, a sample of thirty
cultivating and ten landless households was selected. These households were then inter-
viewed frequently- typically every 4 to 6 weeks for eleven years, from 1975 to 1985, and
asked questions about socio-demographic characteristics, production decisions, and trans-
actions in markets. In this study we use data from 1976 through 1981, when more detailed
transactions data were collected. Walker and Ryan (1990) provide extensive socio-economic
profiles of the sample villages, a wealth of institutional, environmental and historical detail,
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as well as a comprehensive summary of the many findings of the surveys. Appendix A to
this paper provides details on how the diﬀerent variables we use are measured.
An important feature of these villages is that income derived from crops has pronounced
seasonal patterns. This is not surprising, given that these villages are in rain-fed areas where
agricultural cultivation depends heavily on monsoon rains. As indicated in Table 1, crop
income accounts for a large share of total annual income for farm households, ranging
from 47.4% in Kanzara to 61.3% in Shirapur. Irrigation, which could potentially result in
less seasonality in profits from crops, is fairly uncommon. Farm households in Aurepalle
and Shirapur had, on average, irrigation for thirteen percent of their cropped area over
the sample period. Irrigation was even less prevalent in Kanzara, reflecting the fact that
Kanzara has rainfall that is higher and less variable than the other areas, see Walker and
Ryan (1990, p. 34).i (Kanzara is also richer than the other villages.)
The combination of monsoon-dependent crops and lack of irrigation results in flows of
income from crops that are very unevenly distributed over the year, much more so than
flows of income from other sources. Figure 1 traces out monthly averages of income from
crops, and income from other sources (trade and handicrafts, wages, and livestock.) The
seasonal patterns in crop income are consistent with the timing of the monsoon (which
occurs between June and September), and the soil conditions and prevalence of irrigation in
each of the three villages. In Aurepalle and Kanzara, the main harvest is of crops planted
with the onset of the monsoon in May and June (”kharif” season crops), and occurs in late
fall. There is a second harvest between March and May. In Aurepalle, this second harvest
consists largely of HYV crops, predominantly paddy, grown on irrigated land. In Kanzara it
consists of longer-duration kharif crops. The timing of crop income in Shirapur diﬀers from
the other villages. There is a single main harvest period, in the first three months of the
calendar year. Farms in Shirapur tend to have deep soils that hold the monsoon rainfall.
Crops are typically planted after the monsoon is completed, and harvested late (see Walker
and Ryan, 1990). Because farm households rely more heavily on crop income than do other
households, they also have more seasonally variable total household income. As shown in
Table 1, the fraction of income received by farm households in the three highest-income
months ranges from 61.3% in Aurepalle to 81.8% in Shirapur. The corresponding fractions
for non-farm households are much lower, ranging from 39% in Aurepalle to 46% in Shirapur.
Does the higher degree of seasonality in the incomes of farm households translate into
higher seasonality in consumption expenditure? The evidence in Table 1 suggests not. Even
for farm households, both food expenditure and expenditure on all nondurable goods are
less concentrated (in the top three months) than is income. For example, in Aurepalle, 38%
of expenditure by farm households is incurred in the three highest months, whereas 61% of
income is earned in the three highest months. Furthermore, the level of concentration of
expenditure (in the top three months) is nearly the same for farm and non-farm households
within each village.
Further evidence on the timing of income and expenditure for farm and non-farm house-
holds is presented in Figure 2. These graphs display the month eﬀects estimated from re-
gressions of the log of monthly expenditure and of monthly income (relative to its average
value) on a set of month dummies, which were allowed to vary across farm and non-farm
households. Specifically, the equation for income is:
Aimt = αm + α
F
mFit + eimt (2.1)
whereAimt is the ratio of household i’s total income in monthm and year t to the household’s
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average monthly income in year t (i.e. annual income divided by 12.)4 This variable
is regressed on a set of dummy variables for each month and a set of month dummies
interacted with an indicator of farm status Fit, which equals 1 if the household has gross
cropped area in excess of 0.5 hectares, and equals 0 otherwise. Thus, the parameters m
measure month eﬀects in the income share for nonfarm households. Month eﬀects in the
income share for farm households are measured as αm+αFm. The parameters α
F
m represent
the diﬀerence in the month eﬀects between the farm and non-farm households. An intercept
is included, so the first month eﬀect, α1, is normalized to equal zero.
The expenditure equation is:
ln(Eimt) = Xitβ0 + β
FFit + βm + β
F
mFit + uimt (2.2)
where ln(Eimt) is the logarithm of expenditure of household i in month m in year t (see
Paxson (1992) for a derivation of this expenditure equation). Two variants of (2.2) are
estimated. In the first, Eimt denotes total nondurable expenditure, and in the second it
denotes food expenditure. Both measures include the value of food produced and consumed
at home. The expenditure measure is regressed on a set of variables Xit that are constant
within years, including the logarithm of average monthly income, the numbers of males,
females, and children in the household at the beginning of the year, a set of year dummies,
and a constant. The coeﬃcients βm denote month eﬀects in expenditure for nonfarm house-
holds, and since an intercept in included in the equation the coeﬃcient for the first month
(β1) is normalized to zero. The coeﬃcients β
F
m denote month-specific diﬀerences between
farm and nonfarm households. Again, since a variable denoting farm status is included, the
first of these month/farm interactions is normalized to zero. Thus, the diﬀerence between
farm and nonfarm expenditure in any month (given Xit) equals βF for month 1 (January),
and βF +βFm for all other months. Table 2 presents the results of F-tests of the significance
of the month eﬀects and the month-farm status interactions.
The results in Figure 2 confirm the patterns suggested by Table 1. First, farm and non-
farm households have diﬀerent seasonal income patterns. Income is relatively flat across
seasons for non-farm households, and in fact F-tests indicate that the hypothesis that there
are no month eﬀects in the incomes of non-farm households cannot be rejected for any village
except (perhaps weakly) for Shirapur. The month eﬀects in income for farm households are
jointly significant, and the hypothesis of identical month eﬀects across farm and nonfarm
households is strongly rejected. Second, although there are typically seasonal patterns in
expenditure, these seasonal patterns are for the most part similar across farm and non-farm
households. As shown in Figure 2, expenditure is lower during the summer months, and
higher during the harvest periods. (Note that the scale for the expenditure graphs is nearly
10 times smaller than for the income graphs.) However, these patterns in expenditure
appear for both farm and non-farm households: the post-harvest expenditure boom is not
confined to households with high harvest income. This is true for both food and non-
durable expenditure. Tests for whether month eﬀects in expenditure are identical across
farm and non-farm households cannot be rejected in Aurepalle and Shirapur (see Table 2).
The results for Kanzara are slightly diﬀerent. The hypothesis that the month eﬀects in
4Monthly income is divided by average monthly income to remove scale eﬀects. It should also be noted
that “year” refers to the agricultural year (June to May) rather than the calendar year, since the data are
collected on a crop-year basis. However, month eﬀects in income and expenditure are labelled numerically
to correspond to the calendar year, i.e. α1 denotes the month eﬀect in January, α2 denotes the month eﬀect
in February, etc.
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expenditure diﬀer across farm and nonfarm households can be rejected at a confidence level
of .019 (for total expenditure) and .005 (for food.) However, the month eﬀects graphed
in Figure 2 do not indicate that expenditure tracks income across months. For instance,
the expenditure of farm households is low relative to that of nonfarm households between
August through November, but this is not a time period during which farm incomes are
relatively low.
3. Smoothing consumption under income seasonality: theory
The evidence from the previous section indicates that seasonal patterns in consumption do
not track those in income, and that suggests that households are able to smooth consumption
in the face of systematic month-to-month fluctuations in income. Such behavior is consistent
with the standard permanent income model, with complete credit markets. However, we
show in this section that it is also consistent with a buﬀer-stock model of consumption, in
which households cannot borrow at all. Both the permanent income model and the buﬀer-
stock model are well-known in the literature on saving and consumption, but they have
been typically used to analyze annual rather than seasonal consumption patterns. Here
we explore the implications of the two models for consumption behavior when income is
seasonal. We begin with the permanent-income model.
Assume that preferences are quadratic and separable across periods, that the rate of
time preference is equal to a fixed interest rate r, and that preferences do not vary across
time periods. Then, the change in consumption from period to period can be expressed as:




where ct denotes consumption in time t and Yt is non-asset income in time t. Et is the
expectations operator, conditional on information known at time t. In words, the change
in consumption between t− 1 and t is equal to the revision in permanent income between
the two periods, where permanent income equals the annuity value of discounted future
earnings plus the value of current assets. Equation (3.1) does not explicitly incorporate
income seasonality, but since the equation is valid for any income process, it applies equally
to situations with seasonal income variation. One can let “t” denote a month rather than a
year, and allow average income levels (and higher moments of income) to vary systematically
across months.
Equation (3.1) implies that since consumption responds only to unexpected innova-
tions in permanent income, deterministic seasonal patterns in income should have no aﬀect
on consumption. The expected value of the change in consumption between two months,
conditional on information known in the earlier month, is zero. Therefore, (3.1) implies
that on average there will be no seasonal consumption variation. More general models
of consumption–for instance those that allow for seasonal variation in preferences, prices
or interest rates, or seasonal patterns in the resolution of income uncertainty (see Chaud-
huri(1999) for an example of the latter)–do yield systematic seasonal patterns in consump-
tion. However, even in these more general models, seasonality in income levels will not
directly translate into consumption seasonality and consumption will still not respond to
anticipated income changes.5
5A large number of papers over the last two decades have used household-level data to empirically
investigate whether, contrary to the implications of the basic theory, household consumption does indeed
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An alternative to the PIH is the buﬀer-stock model presented in Deaton (1989,1991).
In this model, households are prohibited from borrowing, but can accumulate assets used
to buﬀer consumption from income fluctuations. Deaton adds a precautionary motive for
saving by assuming isoelastic preferences, which imply convex marginal utility. In addition,
consumers are assumed to be impatient, meaning that their rate of time preference (denoted
δ) exceeds the interest rate r. Given these assumptions, consumers save only to buﬀer their
consumption from short-term income fluctuations. Impatience prevents long-term asset
accumulation, but caution coupled with borrowing constraints provides incentives to hold
a buﬀer of assets in most periods. Consumption is generally smooth relative to income, but
at times declines abruptly in periods when assets are drawn down to zero. We work with
this basic model, but make the additional assumption that income is seasonal. We then
present simulations of the model, to investigate how credit constraints and precautionary
savings motives aﬀect consumption seasonality.
Assume that there are two seasons, 1 and 2. Assets must be nonnegative in both seasons




2j + u(c2,t+j)(1+ δ)
2j+1] (3.2)
where δ is the positive rate of time preference, cmt is consumption in season m of year t,
and u(cmt) is the sub-utility function in season m of year t. The maximization problem for
consumers starting in period 2 is identical, but with the season subscripts for consumption
switched. Assets evolve across seasons according to:
a2t = (1+ r)[a1t − c1t] + Y2t (3.3)
and
a1t = (1+ r)[a2,t−1 − c2,t−1] + Y1t (3.4)
where amt represents cash-on-hand at the beginning of season m in year t, equal to the sum
of assets held over from the previous season (including any interest they have earned), plus
Ymt, income earned in season m of year t.
Utility maximization yields the following Euler equations for consumption in each season:
u0(c1t) = max{u0(a1t),βE1t[u0(c2t)]} (3.5)
and
u0(c2t) = max{u0(a2t),βE2t[u0(c1,t+1)]} (3.6)
where marginal utility is denoted u0(cmt), and in what follows we will assume preferences are
isoelastic such that u0(cmt) equals c−ρmt. The term β equals [(1+ r)/(1+ δ)], and impatience
implies that β < 1. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are standard Euler equations, modified to
respond to predictable income changes. The early results tended to be mixed, perhaps in part due to the
diﬃculties of adequately identifying the predictable component of income changes. More recently, however, a
number of papers have cleverly exploited exogenous, institutionally derived sources of variation in the timing
and magnitude of household income flows to test this hypothesis. For instance, Souleles (1999) examines
the response of household consumption to the receipt of (predictable) income tax refunds, Parker (1999)
estimates households’ propensity to consume out of predictable increases in take-home pay associated with
the reduction in Social Security tax withholdings when the Social Security tax cap is reached, and Shapiro
and Slemrod (1995) report the results of a survey in which consumers were asked what they planned to do
with the increase in take-home pay that resulted from an executive order issued by President Bush in early
1992 reducing standard tax-withholding rates.
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account for the presence of borrowing constraints. Consumption in any period can rise no
higher than amt, and this upper bound on consumption implies a lower bound for marginal
utility.
To add content to equations (3.5) and (3.6), it is necessary to make assumptions about
the income process in each season. We assume that season 1 is the growing season, during
which income is low on average but fairly stable, and that season 2 is the harvest season,
during which income has a high mean and a high variance. Specifically:
Ymt ∼ (Y mt,σ2m), Y 1 < Y 2,σ21 < σ22
Income in season m has support [Y Lm , Y
H
m ], and we assume that Y
L
m exceeds zero for both
seasons. We assume incomes are independently distributed across seasons and years, and
that farmers receive no information during the growing season about what harvest season
incomes are likely to be.6
Given these assumptions, the Euler equations will be solved by a unique set of season-
specific consumption functions. Consumption in season m is a function of cash-on-hand
in the beginning of that season, and is denoted cm(am). The consumption functions are
defined implicitly by the following equations:
[cm(am)]
−ρ = max{a−ρm ,β
Z Y Hn
Y Ln
cn([1+ r][am − cm(am)] + Yn)−ρdFn(Yn)} (3.7)
where Fn(Yn) is the distribution function for Yn.
We examine how seasonal patterns in the means and variances of income aﬀect the
prevalence of borrowing constraints and seasonal consumption patterns. Intuition suggests
that consumers will be less likely to face binding borrowing constraints in the high-income
harvest period (season 2). Since growing-season income is lower on average than harvest
income, farmers have incentives to carry positive assets out of the harvest period. It is
shown in Appendix B that a suﬃcient condition for farmers to never face binding borrowing
constraints in season 2 is that Y L2 > β
−1/ρY H1 . In words, if the worst possible income during
the harvest season exceeds the best possible income during the growing season (scaled by
a factor of β−1/ρ, which exceeds 1) then the farmer will always carry positive assets out
of the harvest period. Note that this condition is suﬃcient but not necessary, and it is
possible that the farmer will always carry positive assets of out the harvest period even in if
Y L2 < β
−1/ρY H1 . Borrowing constraints will also never bind in the harvest period if Y L1 ≤ 0.
Households will always carry positive assets out of the harvest season to guard against the
possibility that growing season income (and consumption) is zero.7
Numerical calculations are required to illustrate further properties of the season-specific
consumption functions. We calculated the consumption functions under the following as-
sumptions about income, preferences, and the rate of interest rate.8 First, we make the
6It is straightforward, in theory, to allow for the accumulation of information about future harvests.
Consumption then becomes a function of two state variables, cash-on-hand and information held at the
beginning of each time period. In practice, adding state variables makes it much more diﬃcult to obtain
numerical solutions for the consumption functions, since one must solve for consumption for all possible
combinations of the state variables.
7 In this case, it must be that the household begins life (in season 1) with positive assets, to guarantee
positive consumption in the first time period.
8The general method for simulating consumption functions is described in Deaton (1989). The analysis
in this paper is complicated somewhat by the fact that solutions must be found for two season-specific
consumption functions.
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simplifying assumption that income in each season follows a Bernoulli distribution, with a
50% chance that realized income is “high” and a 50% chance that it is “low”. Our base-
line case (Case 1) is one in which income in the harvest season 2 equals either 50 or 150,
and income in the growing season 1 is either 10 or 30, so that on average harvest-season
income is five times growing-season income, which is consistent with the evidence from the
ICRISAT data. We chose r to equal 0, which would be the appropriate interest rate in a
pure stocking model (with no depreciation), and δ to equal .05. The preference parameter
ρ is set to 3. We then vary the spread of income is each season, first allowing the coeﬃcient
of variation of growing season income to drop from .5 to .25 (Case 2), and then allowing the
coeﬃcient of variation of harvest season income to drop from .5 to .25 (Case 3). In all of
our calculations, we choose parameters such that Y L2 > β
−1/ρY H1 , implying that borrowing
constraints never bind in the harvest period.
The top panel of Figure 3 graphs consumption in each season against cash-on-hand, for
Cases 1 and 3. (The consumption functions for Case 2 are similar.) In each case, harvest
season consumption is less than cash-on-hand: borrowing constraints never bind in the
harvest season, and farmers always carry positive assets into the following growing season.
In the growing season borrowing constraints may bind. The threshold levels of cash-on-
hand at which borrowing constraints just bind are shown as vertical lines on the graph. If
cash-on-hand in the growing season is less than the threshold level, the farmer consumes all
cash on hand in the growing season and enters the following harvest period with no assets.
The levels of cash-on-hand at which borrowing constraints just bind are in both cases more
than twice average growing-season income.
For each of the three cases, we simulated 5000 “years” of realizations for income, con-
sumption, and assets, and these realizations are used to determine the likelihood that bor-
rowing constraints bind, and the extent of consumption seasonality.The lower panel of Fig-
ure 3 graphs 100 “years” of realizations for consumption and cash-on-hand for Cases 1 and
3, and Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on consumption, assets, and borrowing con-
straints, using the data from all 5000 “years” for all three cases. These results illustrate the
following points:
(i) Borrowing constraints Borrowing constraints bind infrequently. The infrequency of
binding constraints can be seen from the graphs in the lower panel of Figure 3, which show
that consumption equals cash-on-hand only occasionally, and from the summary statistics
in Table 3, which show that constraints bind only 3% to 10% of the time. The results
also indicate that reducing the variance of either harvest-season or growing-season income
can increase the likelihood that borrowing constraints bind (contrast Cases 2 and 3 with
Case 1). As the variance of income falls, farmers hold lower levels of assets on average, and
it is more likely that cash-on-hand in the growing season will fall below the critical level at
which borrowing constraints bind. For example, a reduction in the coeﬃcient of variation
of harvest-season income from .5 to .25 (i.e. moving from Case 1 to Case 3) reduces average
cash-on-hand in the growing season from 158.5 to 92.5, and increases the probability that
borrowing constraints bind from 3.3% to 10.1%. An important conclusion to draw from
this result is that the prevalence of borrowing constraints is not a good indicator of welfare,
since welfare-improving reductions in income variability (holding average income fixed) can
result in more frequently binding borrowing constraints.
(ii) Seasonal consumption patterns In all three cases, consumption displays systematic
seasonal variation. Specifically, consumption falls on average between the harvest and grow-
ing season, and rises from the growing season to the harvest. The growth in consumption
into the harvest season can be accounted for by the precautionary motive, which tends
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to depress consumption in the low-variance growing season relative to the high-variance
harvest season, and by borrowing constraints, which at times prevent the household from
consuming as much during the growing season as it would if it could borrow. Although con-
sumption displays systematic seasonal variation, the amount of seasonal variation is small,
on the order of a 2% change in consumption between seasons (see Table 3).
In summary, the simulation results show that even in the complete absence of credit
markets and the presence of substantial income seasonality, buﬀering behavior may be used
to nearly eliminate consumption seasonality. An implication is that our empirical results
from the previous section do not necessarily indicate that credit markets work well within
these villages, and in fact may be consistent with the buﬀer-stock model. Our finding
that seasonal patterns in consumption are similar for farm and nonfarm households, despite
diﬀerent seasonal income patterns, could simply reflect the fact that farm households smooth
consumption through buﬀering.
4. Buﬀer stocks vs. credit markets: some suggestive evidence
The theory and simulations discussed in the previous section indicate that the finding that
consumption expenditure does not track income across months, despite large seasonal vari-
ations in income for some households, does not by itself constitute persuasive evidence that
credit markets function well. We therefore turn, in this section to other sources of evidence
regarding the relative importance of buﬀer stocks and credit markets in enabling house-
holds to smooth consumption under income seasonality. We first examine direct evidence
on the particular mechanisms–transactions in financial markets, both formal and informal,
purchases and sales of physical assets, accumulation and decumulation of grain stocks and
cash reserves–households rely on to smooth consumption in the face of income seasonality.
We then implement a more formal test of the permanent income hypothesis (with complete
credit markets). Data constraints limit what we are able to say, but the additional evidence
we consider is indicative of buﬀering behavior and suggests that borrowing constraints may
be operative in two of the three villages.
4.1. Direct evidence on the mechanisms of consumption smoothing
On a month to month basis, we do not directly observe the stocks of financial and physical
assets, grain and cash held by the households. However, at each interview (roughly about
every four to six weeks), households were asked to provide details of all their transactions
in financial, asset and grain markets since the previous interview. We use these data to
construct two measures of monthly changes in stocks of financial and physical assets. The
first is a measure of the net change in financial assets (excluding cash reserves), and is
defined as deposits minus withdrawals from banks and other financial institutions, minus net
increases in debt (from both formal and informal loan markets.) Changes in cash balances
are not recorded, and so are not included in this measure. To obtain our second measure,
the “net change in financial and phsyical assets,” we add to the net change in financial
assets, the value of purchases minus sales of land, buildings, equipment, livestock, durable
goods, and jewelry. This is not a complete measure of the net change in wealth, since it does
not include changes in stocks of grains or cash balances. If the asset transactions data are
accurate, then the diﬀerence between income and consumption that is not accounted for by
the measured net change in financial and physical assets must (by definition) be accounted
for by changes in either stocks of cash or grains.
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Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the two measures of changes in physical and
financial assets. The top panel of Table 4 presents information on the percentage of ob-
servations with month-to-month changes in financial assets or in net financial and physical
assets. The percentage of household reporting increases or decreases in net financial assets
in the period before the survey (roughly 4 to 6 weeks) ranges from 18% to 41%, with more
households reporting decreases than increases.9 Farm households appear to be somewhat
more active in financial markets than nonfarm households in Shirapur and Kanzara. The
percentage of households with changes in net financial and physical assets is higher, but
shows the same asymmetry between increases and declines for all villages except Kanzara.10
Walker and Ryan (1990, Table 7.2) presents information on credit market transactions that
is disaggregated by the source of loans, and finds that formal sector loans are relatively rare
in Aurepalle and Shirapur, with over 70% of total lending (in rupees) coming from informal
sources between 1976-77 and 1984-85. In Kanzara the situation is somewhat diﬀerent, with
formal sector loans accounting for 70% of total lending (by value of loans) and for about
40% of credit market transactions. The bottom panel of Table 6 provides median asset
changes conditional on asset changes being non-zero. Farm households have larger median
asset changes (either positive or negative) than nonfarm households.
Table 4 indicates that households are fairly active in asset markets. But are transactions
in financial and physical asset markets the main mechanism for smoothing consumption? If
so, there should be strong month eﬀects in the measured changes in financial and physical
assets for farm households. Why? Because the results of the second section suggest that
there should be strong month eﬀects in the total savings (i.e., income minus consumption)
of farm households. And that is confirmed through regressions of total savings on a set of
month eﬀects and month-farm interactions which indicate that there are indeed significant
month eﬀects in total savings for both farm and non-farm households and that these month
eﬀects diﬀer significantly across the two groups. In particular, one might expect to find that
during the growing season farm households either draw down financial assets or take out
loans, and then either repay loans or save at harvest time. Walker and Ryan (1990) discuss
how smaller farm households often rely on moneylenders to provide growing-season credit,
which is repaid at the time of threshing. Furthermore, since farm and nonfarm households
have diﬀerent income patterns but similar consumption patterns, seasonal asset changes
should diﬀer across these two groups of households.
To test these propositions we regressed our measure of changes in financial and physical
assets on a set of month dummies and a set of month-farm interactions. In all villages,
the diﬀerences in the month eﬀects in measured asset changes between farm and nonfarm
households are jointly insignificant. The conclusion that seasonal consumption smoothing is
not accomplished through transactions in financial and physical asset markets is reinforced
in Figure 4. There, we plot the monthly averages of total savings and of measured changes
in financials and physical assets for farm households in each of the three villages. Graphs
9There is, of course, no reason why the percentage of observations that have asset increases must match
the percentage of observations with asset declines. However, if it were the case that households take out loans
and then gradually repay them over time, one would expect to see the opposite pattern. Underreporting of
small asset transactions is a possibility.
10Note that a non-zero net change in financial assets need not imply a non-zero net change in the sum of
financial and physical assets. Whether it does or not depends on the extent to which changes in financial
assets reflect portfolio adjustments rather than ex-post consumption smoothing. For instance, if households
were primarily adjusting their portfolios, e.g., drawing down financial assets to finance the purchase of
physical assets, the decrease in financial assets would be oﬀset by an increase in physcial assets, resulting in
no net change in the sum of physical and financial assets.
10
for nonfarm households are not shown, but indicate much less seasonal variation in saving.
As anticipated by the regression results we report above, there appear to be strong seasonal
patterns in total savings, but in all three villages, there is little indication that transactions
in financial and physical asset markets account for this seasonal variation.
It is of course possible that households underreport transactions in financial and real
asset markets. It is also possible that our results are contaminated by outliers which obscure
seasonal patterns in the data.11 And so our finding that financial and real asset markets play
a limited role in helping households smooth consumption needs to be treated with caution.
However, we can provide aﬃrmative evidence that households do rely on accumulation and
decumulation of grain stocks to buﬀer consumption from seasonal income variation. Figure 5
shows monthly averages of the value of crop output and crop sales for farm households in
each of the villages. Although the seasonal patterns of crop sales and output are similar,
crop sales are more smoothly spread out across months. Overall, this evidence supports
the idea that seasonal consumption smoothing is accomplished through changes in stocks
of grains and cash.
4.2. Additional tests for complete credit markets
To more formally distinguish the buﬀer-stock model from the permanent income model,
we next turn to an additional implication of the buﬀering model which provides a clearer
alternative against which the permanent income model can be tested. The permanent
income model implies that changes in consumption between periods t and t + 1 should be
orthogonal to any variables whose values are known prior to the realization of income in
period t+1: changes in consumption should only reflect new information about permanent
income. This is not an implication of the buﬀer stock model, since borrowing constraints
at times prevent consumers from fully adjusting consumption in response to anticipated
income changes. Specifically, consumers with low levels of cash-on-hand who want to borrow
(but cannot) will experience larger average consumption changes than in periods in which
constraints are not binding, and consumption changes will display “excess sensitivity” to
anticipated income changes.
This is a well-known diﬀerence between the two models and a common way of testing
for it has been to implement some version of an excess-sensitivity test, for instance by
testing whether changes in consumption observed in household data are correlated with
instruments for anticipated income changes. The problem with this test however, is that it
only reveals borrowing constraints when such constraints are binding. But as our simulations
indicate, given the buﬀering behavior of households, borrowing constraints rarely bind:
under the parameter configurations we use, assets are drawn down to zero only in the
growing season, and then too, only between 3% to 10% of the time. We therefore propose,
and then implement using the ICRISAT data, a slightly diﬀerent version of the excess-
sensitivity test which addresses this issue.
The test we propose builds on a key insight that emerges from the analysis of the
buﬀering model in Deaton (1991) and is also borne out in our simulations. It is that
while buﬀering behavior appears to delink consumption from income over short intervals
so that consumption appears fairly stable even with fluctuating income flows, over longer
intervals, consumption and income are more closely linked. What this suggests is that under
a buﬀering model we expect to only observe consumption smoothing over short intervals
11We were unable to apply standard techniques for dealing with outliers (such as looking at seasonal
patterns in median asset changes) since the median household in each month reports no change in assets.
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– what Deaton (1991) terms “high frequency” savings – in contrast, traditional life-cycle
models, of which the permanent income model is a special case, imply both high-frequency
saving and dissaving, as well as “low frequency” consumption smoothing over longer periods.
This is, in principle, a testable diﬀerence between the two models if the relevant intervals can
be appropriately designated. In environments with pronounced income seasonality a natural
distinction is suggested between high frequency consumption smoothing which occurs within
an income cycle (i.e. a full harvest-planting cycle) and longer-term consumption smoothing,
across income cycles. An obvious way to test for this diﬀerence then is to apply the standard
excess-sensitivity test first to consumption changes within an income-cycle and then to
consumption changes across income-cycles.
To ascertain whether this diﬀerence is likely to be empirically discernable we again
turn to simulations. For each of the three cases described above, we constructed a series of
consumption, income and cash-on-hand variables for 100 households for 10 years (where each
“year” contains a growing season and a harvest season) using randomly generated income
numbers and the simulated consumption functions shown in Figure 3.12 These “data” are
used to estimate standard Euler equations. We first regress the change in consumption on
the lagged value of cash-on-hand, and then regress the change in consumption on the change
in income, where the income change is instrumented by lagged assets. Under the null of
the PIH, neither lagged assets nor the predicted change in income will aﬀect the change
in consumption. With borrowing constraints, we expect that the change in consumption
will be negatively correlated with lagged assets, and positively correlated with anticipated
income changes. Moreover, we expect that any excess-sensitivity finding will be stronger
when the data are aggregated up to a year.
Table 5 shows parameter estimates from these regressions, using simulated data. Columns 1
and 2 contain results when consumption and income changes are measured at the seasonal
level. The change in consumption is defined as consumption in the current season mi-
nus consumption in the preceding season, and the change in income is defined in a similar
manner. Lagged cash-on-hand is the value of cash-on-hand held at the beginning of the pre-
ceding season. In columns 3 and 4 the data are aggregated up to the annual level, i.e., over
seasons. The change in consumption is therefore annual consumption in the current year
minus annual consumption in the past year, and the change in income is defined similarly.
Lagged cash-on-hand is defined as cash-on-hand at the beginning of the past year.
As expected, the PIH is rejected using these simulated data. Consumption changes are
not orthogonal to lagged cash-on-hand, and the change in consumption is positively related
to the predicted change in income. However, the sensitivity of consumption changes to
lagged assets and to predicted income changes varies considerably across the three cases,
and it is not surprising that the coeﬃcient on predicted income is largest in Case 3, where
the frequency that borrowing constraints bind is the highest.
The parameter estimates also depend on whether consumption changes are measured
at the seasonal or annual level. The coeﬃcients on lags of cash-on-hand and on predicted
incomes are smaller, in absolute value, when consumption changes are measured seasonally
(columns 1 and 2) than when the changes are measured over annual intervals (columns 3 and
4). This is, as we suggested above, due to the fact that borrowing constraints bind only in
one of the two seasons. When consumption changes are measured at the seasonal level, the
12Although we use “year” to refer to the longer-interval containing the growing and harvesting seasons,
a more appropriate term might be “crop-cycle” since in two of the sample villages there are actually two
“crop-cycles” within an agricultural year.
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parameter estimates represent a blend of little excess sensitivity between a harvest season
and the following growing season, and higher excess sensitivity between a growing season
and the following harvest season, since it is only in this period that borrowing constraints
ever bind.
These results correspond well with our earlier discussion. We therefore estimate equa-
tions similar to those shown in Table 5 using the ICRISAT data, and using several diﬀerent
time intervals to measure consumption and income changes. These results are presented
in Table 6. We regressed consumption changes on income changes separately for each vil-
lage. In the first column of Table 6, consumption and income changes are measured at the
monthly level. The instruments for the change in income include the household’s monthly
income in the same month of the previous year, and a measure of the area cultivated in the
previous month interacted with a set of month dummies. Since all of these variables were
known by the household before the measured consumption change took place, they are all
valid instruments for income. Under the null of the PIH, the change in income predicted
by these variables should not be related to the change in consumption. In column 2 of
Table 6, consumption and income changes are measured at the seasonal rather than the
monthly level. Consumption and income are first aggregated into two seasons, one span-
ning May to October (the “kharif” season) and the second spanning November to April
(the “rabi” season). For Aurepalle and Kanzara, each of these seasons includes a full cycle
of planting and harvesting. Consumption and income changes are measured across seasons,
and the instrument list consists of the change in income experienced in the same season
in the previous year, as well as measures of cultivated area in each season of the previous
year. In column 3, the data are further aggregated up to the annual level, with income and
consumption changes measured from year to year. For this last case, the instruments for
the income change consist of a vector of lagged changes in assets, including land-holdings,
livestock, farm implements, liquid assets, and total wealth. These variables were chosen as
instruments because they predict changes in income well, and were known by households
before the consumption change took place.
The results provide only modest evidence against the PIH, and the results are very
sensitive to the time period over which consumption changes are measured. In all three
villages, when consumption changes are measured at the monthly level, predicted income
changes are not significantly related to consumption changes. The set of lagged income
changes and lagged cultivated area used as instruments are good predictors of monthly
income changes (Test 2), but are only weakly related to monthly consumption changes
(Test 1). Thus, using monthly data, the PIH can be rejected for no village.
When consumption and income are measured at the seasonal level, the evidence against
the PIH is somewhat stronger for two of the villages. In Aurepalle and Shirapur, the
IV estimates yield “excess sensitivity” measures of .13 and .09, respectively, and both of
these coeﬃcients are significant. Furthermore, in both of these villages the overidentifying
restrictions cannot be rejected at the 5% level. For these two villages, it appears that
seasonal consumption changes are related to predictable seasonal income changes. The
results for Kanzara are diﬀerent. The set of instruments are good predictors of seasonal
income changes, but are unrelated to seasonal consumption changes. As discussed above,
Kanzara is the richest of the three villages, and has the most active financial markets, so
these results may not be surprising.
The results when consumption and income changes are measured annually are mixed.
In Aurepalle, lagged asset changes are related to both annual consumption and income
changes (Tests 1 and 2), but consumption changes are not related to predicted income
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changes, and the overidentifying restrictions are strongly rejected. Although these results
provide evidence against the PIH, the coeﬃcient on the predicted income change is not what
would be expected from a buﬀering model. The annual results for Shirapur and Kanzara do
not provide evidence against the PIH. Predicted income changes appear to have no eﬀect
on consumption, and lagged asset changes are not highly significant in the reduced form
consumption change equations. However, for these two villages lagged asset changes do not
predict income changes particularly well, and the results may be explained by a weak set
of instruments. Overall, these results are not inconsistent with results other researchers
have found using ICRISAT data at the annual level. For example, Morduch (1990), using
data on annual food consumption, finds the strongest evidence of borrowing constraints
in Aurepalle, some evidence of constraints in Shirapur, and no evidence of constraints in
Kanzara.
5. Conclusions
This paper has investigated whether rural Indian households who experience seasonal in-
come variation also experience seasonal consumption variation. The major finding of the
first section of the paper is that, at the household level, seasonal consumption and income
patterns are largely unrelated. The seasonal consumption patterns of diﬀerent groups of
households are similar despite dramatic diﬀerences in the timing of income flows.
One might infer from these results that seasonal credit markets work well within these
villages. However, there is both empirical and theoretical evidence that this need not be the
case. First, farm households, who experience the largest seasonal income variation, appear
to make little use of financial markets to smooth consumption across months. Instead,
there is (somewhat sketchy) evidence that farm households accumulate and draw down
stocks of cash and grains over the course of the year to smooth consumption. Although
this evidence does not prove that specific households face borrowing constraints, it suggests
that borrowing constraints may be operative. Second, our simulations of the consumption
behavior of cautious households who are barred from borrowing yield consumption patterns
that are quite smooth across seasons, with an average increase in consumption from the
growing season to the harvest season of only about 2%. Stocking behavior can potentially
nearly eliminate systematic seasonal consumption patterns. Third, we find some evidence
of “excess sensitivity” of consumption changes to anticipated income changes in two of the
three villages. For these two villages, the permanent income hypothesis can be rejected in
favor of the buﬀering model. For these three reasons we would be hesitant to claim that
credit markets function perfectly within these villages.
We also find that there are seasonal patterns in consumption common across households
within villages. These common seasonal patterns could be due to seasonal patterns in
preferences common to all households, or to seasonal patterns in prices (which could in
turn be due to seasonal variation in aggregate village income). Without knowing which of
these factors is responsible for seasonal consumption variation, it is impossible to determine
whether reducing seasonal consumption variation is an appropriate policy goal, and, if so,
what policies should be used to achieve a reduction. If seasonal preference variation drives
seasonal consumption variation, then policy interventions are clearly unnecessary. If, on
the other hand, seasonal consumption variation is due to seasonal price variation, then
market interventions may be appropriate, provided there is more seasonal price variation
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Appendix A
The data were collected by resident-investigators who lived in the villages during the
collection process. The collection of the data was organized into schedules. We use the
data from the plot-cultivation schedule, the transactions schedule, and the asset-inventory
schedules. The plot-cultivation schedule records the dates and detailed input-output data
of all production operations at the plot-level, as well as various plot characteristics, for
all operational holdings of the sample households over the entire period of ten years. The
schedule was maintained on a monthly basis. The transactions schedule, generally recorded
every three to four weeks, catalogs all transactions (i.e., flows of goods, services and cash
into or out of the household) reported by the households. Thus, purchases and sales of
commodities, loans given or taken, wages paid or received, etc., whether in-kind or in cash,
are recorded. In addition an eﬀort was made to record various intra-household transactions.
Transactions were classified under accounts such as cultivation, animal-husbandry, labor,
financial, non-durable consumption, and durable consumption. Fairly disaggregated item-
specific codes were used to identify the goods or services being traded. The coverage of
the schedule was however reduced after 1982; specifically, transactions involving non-food
or minor food items were excluded. To preserve the comprehensiveness of the consumption
data, which we build up from the transactions schedule, we therefore use only the data up
to the 1981-82 agricultural year.
The asset-inventory schedules provide a listing of the quantity and value of various
assets held by the household, assets such as land, livestock, farm-machinery, grain stocks
and jewelry. These schedules were updated only once a year, at the beginning of the crop-
year in June. However, information about asset-holdings at the beginning of the 1975-1976
crop-year was only obtained retrospectively in December, 1975. For this reason, but also
because the 1975-76 crop-year was the first, and hence, trial year of the survey when a lot
of the details were being worked out, we do not use the data from the first year.
Other than the asset-holdings data which were straightforwardly compiled from the
relevant schedules, all the variables that we use in the empirical analysis were constructed
from the raw data in the primary schedules. Monthly income was calculated using data
from the plot-cultivation and transactions schedules. From the plot cultivation schedule we
obtained the value of total crop output during the month, as well as the cost of all material
inputs and draft and human labor.1 The diﬀerence between the two provided a measure of
net income from agriculture. To this we added the net inflows of cash (or cash-equivalent
in-kind flows) from animal husbandry, trade and handicrafts-related activities, and oﬀ-farm
labor which were reported in the transactions schedule for that month. The imputed value
of family labor and own bullock time was recorded as a cost in the plot-cultivation schedule
by ICRISAT, but was not reported as income in the transactions schedule. We therefore
subtracted these imputed costs in arriving at a final figure for the net monthly income of
each household.
The estimates of monthly consumption expenditures were constructed entirely from
the transactions schedule.2 We constructed two separate series, one on food expenditures,
and one which included food and other non-durable items. Ceremonial expenditures were
excluded from both measures. The expenditure data had to be allocated to specific months
since the information on the transactions schedule was collected irregularly. We did this by
calculating the time interval between the current and previous survey date, and allocating
expenditure to a specific month according to the fraction of the time interval that fell in
that month. This procedure for allocating consumption expenditure may make expenditure
appear to be somewhat smoother across months than it actually is, and this should be kept
17
in mind when interpreting the results that follow. However, the time intervals between
surveys were generally quite short, with 91.6% of the observed time intervals equal to one
month or less, and 99.7% with intervals of two months or less.
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Appendix B
We show in this appendix that borrowing constraints will never bind in period 2 if
Y L2 > β
−1/ρY H1 . From (3.7), a borrowing constraint will bind in period 2 for values of






Note that c1(Y1) cannot exceed Y H1 , since Y1 cannot exceed Y
H
1 and consumption cannot





−ρdF1(Y1) ≥ β(Y H1 )−ρ (A.2)
Combining (5.1) and (5.1), a necessary condition for a borrowing constraint to bind in




−ρ ⇐⇒ a2 < β−1/ρY H1 (A.3)
The least a2 that can equal is Y L2 . It follows that if Y
L
2 > β
−1/ρY H1 , it is impossible that
(5.1) is true for any value of a2, and thus, borrowing constraints will never bind in period














































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
-1.5
3





























Month effects in income and expenditure
Case 1:  Growing season income = 10 or 30    Case 3:  Growing season income = 10 or 30  
  Harvest season income = 50 or 150     Harvest season income = 75 or 125 
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Seasonal patterns in crop output and in crop sales 
Table 1
Sample means of income, consumption expenditures and related variables







Range of gross cropped area (ha.) 0 - 0.5 > 0.5 0 - 0.5 > 0.5 0 - 0.5 > 0.5
Monthly income 121.1 385.4 185.0 446.3 184.8 554.0
Gross cropped area (ha.) 0.05 4.48 0.00 6.98 0.03 6.15
Percentage of area irrigated 0.0 13.5 0.0 12.6 0.0 4.4
Percentage of annual income from crop cultivation 1.3 50.4 -1.3 61.3 0.0 47.4
Percentage of annual income received in top 3 months 39.1 61.3 46.3 81.8 41.3 71.5
Monthly expenditure, nondurables 145.4 221.9 242.4 362.1 207.4 350.6
Monthly expenditure, food 105.0 143.7 148.7 222.6 121.4 189.3
Percentage of annual expenditure on food 73.5 68.5 62.6 62.1 60.7 56.1
Percentage of annual nondurable expenditure incurred in
top 3 months 35.5 38.4 41.8 37.3 36.3 38.0
Percentage of annual food expenditure incurred in top 3
months 34.8 37.5 39.9 35.7 36.7 38.1
Sample size (household-months) 660 1716 708 1668 552 2040
Notes: Average monthly incomes and expenditures are in 1983 rupees. The percentage of income/expenditure in top
3 months is calculated as the sum of monthly incomes/expenditures in the 3-highest income/expenditure months of
each year, divided by annual income/expenditure in that year.
Table 2
Test statistics for month effects in income and expenditure
(F-statistics, p-values in parentheses)
Aurepalle Shirapur Kanzara
Observations (household-months) 2328 2364 2568
Income
Test 1: no month effects, nonfarm 0.80 (0.636) 2.04 (0.021) 0.36 (0.970)
Test 2: no month effects, farm 45.17 (0.000) 98.28 (0.000) 80.42 (0.000)
Test 3: month effects identical 10.64 (0.000) 19.94 (0.000) 13.77 (0.000)
R-square 0.179 0.312 0.259
Nondurable expenditure
Test 1: no month effects, nonfarm 1.50 (0.125) 4.46 (0.000) 2.73 (0.002)
Test 2: no month effects, farm 6.62 (0.000) 12.71 (0.000) 8.10 (0.000)
Test 3: month effects identical 0.59 (0.841) 0.56 (0.859) 2.08 (0.019)
R-square 0.451 0.454 0.518
Food expenditure
Test 1: no month effects, nonfarm 0.33 (0.980) 2.37 (0.007) 3.12 (0.000)
Test 2: no month effects, farm 3.94 (0.000) 8.77 (0.000) 4.70 (0.000)
Test 3: month effects identical 0.76 (0.678) 1.35 (0.193) 2.45 (0.005)
R-square 0.413 0.444 0.445
Notes: Test statistics are based on estimates of equations (2.1) and (2.2) in the text. In the top panel, Test 1 is an F-
test for whether the month effects mα  in the income variable imtA are jointly insignificant for nonfarm households.
Test 2 is an F-test for jointly insignificant month effects )( Fmm αα +  for farm households. Test 3 is an F-test for
whether the month effects in income are identical for farm and nonfarm households, i.e, whether Fmα  are jointly
insignificant. The second and third panels repeat these test for ln(expenditure) and ln(food expenditure). The
expenditure equations allow for different intercepts for farm and nonfarm households and the null hypothesis of Test
3 is that the difference between the expenditures of nonfarm households and those of farm households is constant
across months (rather than equal to 0 for all months). In terms of equation (2.2), the test is that Fmβ  are jointly
insignificant. The expenditure equations control for ln(annual income), a set of year dummies, and numbers of males,
females, and children in the household. Figure 2 graphs the estimates of the month effects for farm and nonfarm
households from these regressions.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics: Simulated consumption and cash-on-hand values
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
1Y =10 or 30
2Y =50 or 150
1Y =15 or 25
2Y =50 or 150
1Y =10 or 30
2Y =75 or 125

















Percentage of times borrowing constrained ( tt ac 11 = )? 0.033 0.051 0.101
Value of tc1 at which just constrained 41.58 39.32 51.77



























Notes: These numbers are based on 5000 "years" of randomly drawn income values, and on the solutions for
consumption functions described in the text. To construct income, we drew 5000 random numbers for each season
from a standard normal distribution, and set income equal to its low value if the draw was less than 0 and to its high
value if the draw exceeded 0. Each of the three cases uses of the same series of random draws. One hundred
"years" of simulated values of consumption and cash-on-hand for Cases 1 and 3 are graphed in Figure 4.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics: asset transactions







Observations (household-months) 660 1716 708 1668 552 2040
Percent of observations with:
Increase in net financial assets 6.36 7.28 12.29 16.13 6.34 10.88
Decrease in net financial assets 23.33 20.69 21.05 25.06 12.14 15.29
Increase in net financial & physical assets 6.97 9.91 16.53 21.46 11.96 20.29
Decrease in net financial & physical assets 26.52 30.19 25.14 31.00 15.76 18.43
Median values of changes in:
Financial assets, if change > 0 50 260 50 234 100 312
Financial assets, if change < 0 -70 -150 -65 -200 -75 -215
Financial & physical assets, if change >0 50 117 60 230 47 200
Financial & physical assets, if change < 0 -64 -120 -70 -200 -96 -213
Notes: All information in this table is based on reports of asset transactions collected periodically (every 4 to 6 weeks)
during each survey year. The change in net financial assets equals deposits minus withdrawals from banks and other
financial institutions, minus net increases in debt. Changes in cash balances are not included.  The change in net
wealth equals the net change in financial assets, plus purchases minus sales of: land, buildings, equipment, livestock,
durable goods, and jewelry. Capital gains and losses are not recorded.
Table 5
Estimates of Euler equations: simulated data
Seasonal data Annual dataDependent variable: change in consumption


































Notes:  These estimates are based on simulations of 10 years of data for 500 households (for each case). In columns
1 and 2, changes in consumption and income are measured as changes from season to season, and lagged cash on
hand is cash on hand held at the beginning of the previous season. In columns 3 and 4, consumption and income is
aggregated to annual values, and consumption and income changes are measured as changes in annual values from
year to year. Lagged cash on hand is measured as cash on hand at the beginning of the preceding year. A dummy
variable for the season is included in the regressions shown in column 1 and 2.
Table 6
Estimates of Euler equations: ICRISAT data

















Test 1: instruments jointly insignificant in the reduced form
consumption equation
0.0368 0.0005 0.0000
Test 2: instruments jointly insignificant in the first-stage
income change equation
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Test 3: Test of over-identifying restrictions for the IV equation 0.0253 0.0615 0.0000
Shirapur













Test 1: instruments jointly insignificant in the reduced form
consumption equation
0.8690 0.0587 0.0503
Test 2: instruments jointly insignificant in the first-stage
income change equation
0.0000 0.0000 0.0031
Test 3: Test of over-identifying restrictions for the IV equation 0.9800 0.4140 0.0458
Kanzara













Test 1: instruments jointly insignificant in the reduced form
consumption equation
0.0174 0.2836 0.0670
Test 2: instruments jointly insignificant in the first-stage
income change equation
0.0000 0.0000 0.0056
Test 3: Test of over-identifying restrictions for the IV equation 0.0110 0.7852 0.0830
Notes: In column 1, the dependent variable is the change in consumption between months. In column 2 it is
the change in consumption between seasons, where a season is defined as a six month period running from
May to October or from November to April. In column 3, it is the change in consumption between years. The
change in income in each regression is defined using the same time frame as the change in consumption.
The first row of each panel shows the coefficient (and t-statistic) from an OLS regression of the change in
consumption on the change in income. The second row shows the coefficient from an IV regression of the
change in consumption on the change in income. In column 1, the instruments consist of the income change
from the same month in the previous year and a measure of cultivated area in the previous month interacted
with a set of month dummies. In column 2, the instruments consist of the income change from the same
season in the previous year, and measures of cultivated area in each season of the previous year. In column
3, the instruments consist of a vector of lagged asset changes, including land-holdings, livestock,
implements, liquid assets, and total wealth. The consumption change equations also included a set of month
dummies (column 1), season dummies (column 2) and year dummies (column 3). The three test statistics
are defined as follows. Test 1 is an F-test for the joint insignificance of the instruments in the reduced form
consumption change equation (i.e. the regression of the change in consumption on the time dummies and
the set of instruments.)  Test 2 is an F-test for the joint insignificance of the instruments in the first-stage
income change equation. Test 3 is a test for whether the overidentifying restrictions implicit in the IV
estimates of the consumption change equations can be rejected.
